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CRIMINAL LAW-CALIORNIA DIVERSION STATUTE-PROSECUTORIAL
ROLE IN DivERsioN DECISION CLARIFIED AND LIMITED--People v.
Sledge, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 520 P.2d 4.12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1974);
People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr.
21(1974).
In 1972, the California Legislature enacted statutory provisions
providing for special proceedings in narcotic and drug abuse cases.'
The purpose of the legislation was to offer an alternative to formal
trial and conviction of drug offenders.2 It provides that, when spec-
ified conditions are met, a person charged with one of the enumerated
drug offenses may be "diverted" into a drug education, rehabilitation,
or treatment program instead of facing prosecution.3
The concept of "diversion" is of relatively recent vintage, although
it is not a term that is foreign to the law.4 It generally refers to some
form of intervention in the criminal process, whereby the defendant
is referred to a noncriminal route for disposition, treatment, or super-
vision. Diversion, as discussed herein, can be more precisely viewed
as "an intervention that takes place after the criminal process has been
initiated, that is, after arrest but before trial and conviction." 5
The primary purpose behind the California diversion program is two-
fold. First, it permits the court to identify the experimental or first-
time drug user before he becomes deeply involved with narcotics,
thereby enabling it to deal directly with any underlying medical or so-
cial problems by prompt exposure to educational and counseling pro-
grams in the offender's own community.6 The aim is to restore him to
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1000.4 (West Supp. 1974).
2. See Note, Diversion of Drug Offenders in California, 26 STAN. L. REV. 923
n.2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Diversion].
3. Id. at 923-25.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 564 (1968) defines diversion as "a turning aside or
altering of the natural course of a thing." See, e.g., Archer v. City of Los Angeles,
19 Cal. 2d 19, 26, 119 P.2d 1, 5 (1941) (unauthorized changing of water course to the
prejudice of a lower proprietor); Farray v. Security Nat'1 Bank, 4 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex.
1928) (unauthorized or illegal use of corporate funds).
5. Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System,
60 GEo. L.I. 667, 673 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Addict Diversion]. See note 30 infra
for a discussion of the various times during the criminal process when diversion may be
applied.
6. People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 61, 520 P.2d 405, 407, 113 Cal. Rptr.
21, 23 (1974).
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productive citizenship without the lasting stigma of criminal prosecution
and conviction.7 Secondly, reliance on this method of disposition, when
appropriate, reduces the clogging of the criminal justice system that is
brought about by the myriad of drug abuse prosecutions and thus en-
ables the courts to devote their limited time and resources to cases re-
quiring complete criminal processing.
8
Although diversion potentially offers a new method of social control
that emphasizes human service rather than punishment for first-time
drug offenders, its implementation and application by the judicial sys-
tem are not without problems.9 Two such problems arose as a result
of provisions which granted the district attorney sole authority to de-
termine eligibility for diversion' ° and which purported to subject the
court's decision on diversion to a prosecutorial veto." The issue of
7. Id.
8. Id. at 61-62, 520 P.2d at 407, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 23; see Robertson, Pre-trial Diver-
sion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52 B.U.L. REv. 335, 336-37 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Robertson]; Addict Diversion, supra note 5, at 672-73.
9. Robertson, supra note 8, at 337-38; see Diversion, supra note 2, at 933-34 n.63.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1 (West Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
If the district attorney determines that this chapter may be applicable to the defend-
ant, he shall advise the defendant or his attorney of such determination. If the
defendant consents and waives his right to a speedy trial the district attorney shall
refer the case to the probation department.
11. Id. § 1000.2 (West Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
The defendant's case shall not be diverted unless the district attorney concurs with
the court's determination that the defendant be so referred though such concurrence
is not necessary with respect to the program to which the defendant is referred.
(Emphasis added.)
Although seemingly unique to the California statute, this requirement of the district
attorney's consent has emerged previously in similar diversion statutes in other jurisdic-
tions. In fact, it is characteristic of many diversion programs that the district attorney
retains a right of final determination at the point where an otherwise eligible defendant
formally requests to be diverted. Representative of this type of program is the New
York statutory provision which was first enacted in 1967 for treatment in lieu of prose-
cution. N.Y. MENTA . HYGENE LAw § 210(2)(d) (McKinney 1971) provides in per-
tinent part:
A defendant against whom an indictment, information or complaint is pending
is eligible for civil certification if: . . . (d) the charge against him is a felony and
the district attorney consents to such certification ....
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-484(a) (1969) provides that:
If the accused person is reported to have been probably drug dependent . .. ., upon
agreement between the prosecutor and the accused person, the court may . . . re-
lease the accused person to the custody of the commission on adult probation for
treatment ....
The district attorney is not given as great a degree of discretion in all jurisdictions.
The Massachusetts diversion statute, enacted in 1969, varies significantly from other state
statutes. MAss. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 47 (Supp. 1971). In speaking to the deci-
sion on diversion, the statute provides:
In the event that the defendant requests commitment, and if the court determines
RECENT DECISIONS
whether or not these provisions infringed upon the constitutional realm
of the judiciary was resolved by the California Supreme Court in the
companion cases of Sledge v. Superior Court'2 and People v. Superior
Court (On Tai Ho).'3
In Sledge v. Superior Court, the defendant was charged with viola-
tion of former Health and Safety Code sections 11500, 11530, and
11556.11 Prior to trial, Sledge requested to be considered for the di-
version program. After reviewing defendant's file, however, the district
attorney refused to initiate diversion proceedings.' 5 Defendant re-
sponded by making a motion to the court for an order of referral not-
withstanding the district attorney's refusal to act. The trial court de-
clined to consider the motion on the ground that section 1000 gave
the district attorney sole authority to determine the initial eligibility
for the program.' 6 The California Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's denial of the writ on the ground that the preliminary determi-
nation is not an exercise of judicial power and, hence, does not violate
the California constitutional requirement of separation of powers.'
7
that the defendant is a drug dependent person who is a drug addict who would bene-
fit by treatment . . . the court shall order that the defendant is committed to the
division without consideration of any other factors.
Id. (emphasis added). See Addict Diversion, supra note 5, at 676-87 for a thorough
discussion of presently existing addict diversion programs under state and federal law.
12. 11 Cal. 3d 70, 520 P.2d 412, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1974). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 11357 (West Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
(a) every person who possesses any marijuana, except as otherwise provided by
law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more
than one year or the state prison for a period of not less than one year or more
than 10 years.
The five other divertible offenses covered by the statute are: possession of heroin (id.
§ 11350); possession of restricted dangerous drugs (id. § 11377); possession of ingredi-
ents for manufacture of methamphetamine (id. § 11383); possession of paraphernalia
(id. § 11364); and being present where narcotics are being used (id. § 11365).
The six divertible offenses included within section 1000(a) were renumbered by the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1972 as follows:
Old Health & Safety Code § New Health & Safety Code §
11500 11350
11530 11357
11555 11364
11556 11365
11910 11377
11990 11383
Ch. 1047, § 3, [19721 Cal. Stat. 3015.
13. 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
14. Id. at 73, 520 P.2d at 414, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 30. See note 12 supra.
15. 11 Cal. 3d at 73, 520 P.2d at 414, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
16. Id. See note 12 supra.
17. 11 Cal. 3d at 76, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
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In On Tai Ho, the defendant was detained at the San Francisco air-
port while en route to his -family home in Hawaii for Christmas. A
search by airport officials uncovered six ounces of marijuana, and Ho
was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in
violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11357.18 Ho
thereafter noticed a motion for an order diverting his case pursuant to
Penal Code sections 1000-1000.3,19 and, following appropriate fil-
ings, including notification by the district attorney that Ho was eligible
for the program,20 the probation department commenced an investi-
gation. The department reported to the court that Ho was a "19-
year old college student of exceptional intelligence, the product of a
closely knit Oriental family headed by a prominent physician." 21  The
18. See note 19 infra.
19. 11 Cal. 3d at 63, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24. The court indicated
that after the district attorney has filed the information charging the defendant with pos-
session of marijuana, the defendant must ask to be considered for the diversion program
by filing a notice of motion to that effect. In reference to the actual procedure, the
court noted that,
[a]lthough section 1000 implies that it is the district attorney who initiates the in-
quiry into the applicability of this program, in practice the defendants appear to
be doing so by serving the district attorney with a notice of motion for an order
of diversion, often accompanied by a supporting declaration of eligibility. And al-
though section 1000.1 states it is the district attorney who "shall refer the case to
the probation department," such referral is a judicial act and was properly so treated
by the parties to this proceeding.
Id. at 63 n.4, 520 P.2d at 408 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24 n.4.
At this point the district attorney must determine whether the defendant should be
considered for diversion by applying the four criteria set out in section 1000(a):
(1) The defendant has no prior conviction for any offense involving narcotics
or restricted dangerous drugs.
(2) The offense charged did not involve a crime of violence or threatened
violence.
(3) There is no evidence of a violation relating to narcotics or restricted dan-
gerous drugs other than a violation of the sections listed in this subdivision.
(4) The defendant has no record of probation or parole violations.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a) (West Supp. 1974). Following the district attorney's de-
termination of eligibility pursuant to section 1000(a), Ho "simultaneously filed (1) a
'notification' by the district attorney declaring defendant to be eligible for diversion un-
der section 1000, (2) defendant's consent to referral and waiver of a speedy trial, and
(3) an order of the superior court referring the case to the probation department and
fixing a date for hearing." 11 Cal. 3d at 63, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24
(footnote omitted).
20. 11 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
21. After the district attorney has made the preliminary determination of eligibility,
the probation department makes two inquiries:
First, it investigates the defendant's character and background to determine whether
he would benefit from an educational, treatment, or rehabilitation program. Second,
the department reviews the available community drug programs to determine which
programs would both benefit the defendant and be willing to accept him.
Diversion, supra note 2, at 924.
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probation report concluded that Ho would benefit from formal in-
struction on drug abuse2 2 and, therefore, recommended that Ho be
diverted for a period of one year into a program of drug education
and counseling under appropriate supervision.2"
At the preliminary hearing the lower court declared that it concurred
with the recommendation of the probation report and intended to or-
der diversion.24 The district attorney, however, declined to give his
consent,23 expressing a belief that the program was "inadequate" and
that the amount of marijuana involved was too large for diversion.26
Despite the district attorney's refusal to concur in the program, the
court determined that Ho should be diverted. 7 The California Su-
preme Court2 s upheld the lower court in proclaiming that such a veto
22. In concluding that Ho would benefit from formal instruction on drug abuse, the
probation department took into consideration several factors. They noted that defendant
recognized the seriousness of his conduct and was cooperative with the authorities. Ho
also revealed, during the investigation, that the marijuana was intended solely for his
personal use, and, finally, a records check disclosed that defendant had no prior arrests
for any offense. 11 Cal. 3d at 64, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
23. 11 Cal. 3d at 64, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Section 1000.2 provides
that "[tlhe period during which the further criminal proceedings against the defendant
may be diverted shall be no less than six months nor longer than two years." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1000.2 (West Supp. 1974).
24. 11 Cal. 3d at 64, 520 P.2d at 408, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
25. Id., 520 P.2d at 408-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. Denial of consent was premised
on the district attorney's ostensible authority under section 1000.2 which conditions the
court's determination on diversion upon concurrence of the district attorney. See note
11 supra.
26. The district attorney stated that the quantity of marijuana seized gave rise to
"some inference" that it may have been held for sale, although the inference was "prob-
ably not a provable one." The court dismissed this contention by noting that the charge
filed by the district attorney against the defendant was mere possession. 11 Cal. 3d at
64 n.5, 520 P.2d at 409 n.5, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.5.
27. The lower court ruled that
the record will reflect we recognize the nature of the statute that says this cannot
be done without the concurrence of the District Attorney and I find that that part
of the statute is unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers-taking
power away from the court in the matter of sentencing.
Id. at 64, 520 P.2d at 409, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
28. At oral argument the People, for the first time, urged that, even if the veto power
in the district attorney were invalid, it is not severable from the remainder of the
statute. The majority pointed out that it was improper to raise such new points at oral
argument and ordinarily such questions would not be entertained. The court, however,
did consider the question and citing People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 264, 497 P.2d
481, 492, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137, 148 (1972), resolved the issue of severability adversely
to the People.
Justice Clark, dissenting, was of the opinion that, if the concurrence requirement is
unconstitutional, the entire statute had to fall. He felt that the uniqueness of this statute
is such that it is not "manifest" that the legislature would have enacted it without the
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power in the district attorney violated the California constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.
2 9
In drawing the distinction between the realms of prosecutorial and
judicial power in Sledge and On Tai Ho, the California Supreme Court
focused on several specific provisions of the diversion statute. Under
the California statute, the courts are authorized to "'divert' from the
normal criminal process persons who are formally charged with first-
time possession of drugs, have not yet gone to trial,30 and are found
safeguard of district attorney concurrence. 11 Cal. 3d at 69, 520 P.2d at 412, 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 28.
29. CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 3 provides: "The powers of state government are legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not
exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution." The court fo-
cused on the district attorney's referral of the case to the probation department, an arm
of the judiciary. Having once taken this step, the role of the prosecutor ends and any
subsequent attempt to interfere with proceedings of the court becomes an infringement
upon the powers of the judiciary. See notes 63-78 infra and accompanying text.
30. Although the court clearly discussed Penal Code section 1000 et seq. as authoriz-
ing the courts to divert persons who have not yet gone to trial, a lower appellate court
decision did not limit the purview of the section to that extent.
In People v. Reed, 37 Cal. App. 3d 369, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1974), defendant was
charged with possession of marijuana. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Counsel notified the court that defendant wished to be diverted, but the probation re-
port recommended the case not be diverted. Defendant went to trial and was found
guilty. Prior to sentencing, the court referred the matter to the probation department,
who again recommended against diversion, but did recommend probation. The court
then asked the defendant if he would consent to diversion. The defendant answered in
the affirmative, and over the refusal of the district attorney to concur, the court diverted
the defendant. The Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed, holding that diversion
could be accomplished at any time prior to sentencing. id. at 379, 112 Cal. Rptr. at
499.
However, in Morse v. Municipal Court, - Cal. 3d -, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. -
(1974), Kenneth Morse was also charged with possession of marijuana. At arraignment
he did not consent to diversion, but instead pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress
the incriminating evidence. The motion was denied. Thereafter the defendant advised
the municipal court that he wished to consent to diversion. The prosecutor resisted this
proposal since defendant had already elected not to accept diversion and the municipal
court denied diversion.
The California Supreme Court reversed, ordering that "a writ of mandamus issue
compelling the [municipal] court to commence appropriate proceedings." The court
first examined that portion of section 1000.1 which provides that the district attorney
shall refer the case to the probation department "[if the defendant consents and waives
his right to a speedy trial . . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1 (West Supp. 1974).
Since the defendant possesses a right to a speedy trial until actual commencement of
trial and since the diversion procedure was given no priority in the hierarchy of pre-
trial motions, the court concluded that legislature intended diversion to be available
until the time of trial. This, along with what the court considered the liberal tenor of
the statutory scheme, "requireld] the district attorney to refer a case to the probation
department if a defendant, who has previously been determined eligible . . . , consents
[V1ol. 8
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to be suitable for treatment and rehabilitation at the local level."3 1
Penal Code section 1000 provides that when a defendant is charged
with one of six offenses therein specified, 32 the district attorney will
review the defendant's file to determine whether the accused meets the
statute's minimum standards for diversion, which require that:
(1) The defendant has no prior conviction for any offense involv-
ing narcotics or restricted dangerous drugs.
(2) The offense charged did not involve a crime of violence or
threatened violence.
(3) There is no evidence of a violation relating to narcotics or re-
stricted dangerous drugs other than a violation of -the sections
listed in this subdivision.
(4) The defendant has no record of probation or parole violations.33
The court in Sledge, concerned with these standards and their limita-
tion upon prosecutorial power, predicated its decision upholding the
district attorney's determination of ineligibility on the nature of the in-
formation required under section 1000.11
As to the source of information, the court noted that prior narcotics
convictions or probation and parole violations are quickly and accu-
rately revealed by an examination of records maintained by federal,
state, or local enforcement organizations." The questions of whether
or not the present offense involved actual or threatened violence and
whether or not there is "evidence" of the commission of a narcotics
offense other than those listed in section 1000 can likewise be estab-
lished by consideration of oral or written reports of defendant's current
conduct by such persons as "investigating officers, arresting officers,
victims, witnesses, accomplices, and possibly the defendant himself." '
The Sledge defendant questioned the broad discretion of the district
attorney to determine whether or not there is "evidence" of the com-
mission of a narcotics offense other than simple possession, alleging
that "the district attorney [could]. rely on mere suspicion of illegal
activity and that his determination of ineligibility on that ground is not
to diversion and waives his right to a speedy trial at any time prior to the commence-
ment of trial."
31. 11 Cal. 3d at 61, 520 P.2d at 407, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
32. See note 12 supra.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a) (West Supp. 1974).
34. 11 Cal. 3d at 73, 520 P.2d at 414, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
35. Id.; but see Diversion, supra note 2, at 936-40.
36. 11 Cal. 3d at 73-74, 520 P.2d at 414, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 30; but see Diversion,
supra note 2, at 939-40.
1975]
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subject to judicial review."37  The court summarily dismissed both
allegations's and noted that the legislative purpose was to render ineli-
gible a limited class of persons, namely, "those who are dealing in illegal
narcotics but who have never previously been convicted of any drug
offense and whom the district attorney cannot or does not choose to
charge with trafficking."' 9 In reference to the quantum of "evidence"
necessary before a defendant can be excluded as a member of such a
class it was stated that
"[e]vidence," of course, means more than mere suspicion or rumor; it
means, in this context, reports of actual instances of trafficking or other
information showing that the defendant has probably committed nar-
cotics offenses in addition to those listed in the statute.
40
Although the court purports to lay down a rule or guideline within
which the district attorney's determination of "evidence" must be con-
fined, it is questionable whether it has in fact done so. In Sledge, there
was evidence in the file that defendant was a dealer in drugs, had been
previously convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, and had been ar-
rested for possession of marijuana on several previous occasions.41
There was additional information from informants that defendant was
trafficking in drugs, thus placing him among the class of persons who
is ineligible for diversion.42
In its attempt to negate the defendant's allegations that a "mere
suspicion" of illegal activity is sufficient to establish "evidence" of
other narcotics offenses not covered by the statute, the court set forth
a rather amorphous definition of "evidence," namely, "other informa-
tion showing that defendant has probably committed narcotics offenses
in addition to those listed in the statute." Just what "other informa-
tion" the district attorney may rely on is not mentioned, although the
court was careful to note that the "inquiry need not be limited to in-
formation admissible at a full-fledged criminal trial.
'43
Although the holding in Sledge supports the constitutionality of
37. 11 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
38. Id. at 75, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
39. Id. The court noted that it permitted the issue to be raised by petition for an
extraordinary writ because of the "need for a prompt and definitive resolution of this
constitutional challenge to a new statutory program." Id. at 75-76 n.5, 520 P.2d at 416
n.5, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.5.
40. Id. at 75, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
41. Id. at 75 n.4, 520 P.2d at 415 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31 n.4.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 75, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
[Vol. 8
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such a determination, in light of the definition of "evidence," it argu-
ably could be viewed as a discretionary rather than a ministerial func-
tion, with the prosecutor free to independently determine how the stand-
ards are to be applied.44 This discretionary finding occurs prior to the
court's decision to divert, and it conditions the power of the court to
order diversion, a judicial function, on the approval of the prosecutor.
The California Supreme Court did not specifically address itself to
this question, but merely implied that the prosecutor's role is minister-
ial.40  However, regardless of whether this determination is discre-
tionary or ministerial, due process would seem to require that the de-
fendant be given some opportunity to challenge an unfavorable find-
ing by the prosecutor.4"
It was to this point that the defendant next turned his attention,
and once again the court summarily dismissed his contention, noting
that "the decision of the district attorney that a defendant is ineligible
on this ground is subject to judicial review at the proper time. ' 47  Ac-
cording to the court, the proper -time is after trial when defendant
stands convicted. He may raise on appeal the question of whether or
not there was "evidence," as defined in this case, of his commission of
other narcotics offenses within the meaning of subsection 3 of sub-
division (a).48 Upon a finding of insufficient "evidence," the judgment
44. In Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 331, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1962),
quoting State ex rel. Hammond v. Wimberly, 196 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. 1946), the
court distinguished discretionary and ministerial acts in noting that there were no hard
and fast rules governing the conduct one must or must not take, but "'where the law
prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to
leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial .... '
45. 11 Cal. 3d at 74, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31. In implying that the
acts of the district attorney are merely ministerial, the court noted that the statute
"leaves no room for weighing the effect of the facts" and that
[t]here is no provision here ...for the exercise of judicial discretion to admit an
otherwise ineligible defendant to the program "in the interests of justice," and there-
fore no risk of arbitrary prosecutorial refusal to concur in that decision.
Id.
46. The court in Sledge dismissed defendant's allegations of a violation of due process
in noting that
inasmuch as the resulting ineligibility of persons who have a history of drug abuse
or crimes of violence is rationally related to the purposes of this legislation ...
no denial of equal protection is shown.
11 Cal. 3d at 76 n.7, 520 P.2d at 416 n.7, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.7; but see Diversion,
supra note 2, at 929-30 & nn. 37-44.
47. 11 Cal. 3d at 75, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
48. Id. at 76, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The court suggested that, in order
to provide an adequate record for appeal, the district attorney should serve on the de-
fendant and file with the court a declaration stating the ground upon which the deter-
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must be set aside and the case remanded to permit the trial court to
exercise its discretion to divert the defendant under the remaining por-
tions of the statute.49 Although theoretically providing an opportunity
for judicial review, when one considers the definition of "evidence" to
be applied upon review, meaningful review does not appear promising. 0
In rejecting the defendant's final claim that the district attorney's
determination violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, the court noted that, unlike the trial court which must "consider" the
evidence submitted, the district attorney need not base his decision of
initial eligibility upon information specified as relevant or material un-
der the statute.51 Furthermore, credibility is not an issue when infor-
mation is obtained from official records and reports.52 Thus, the court
concluded that the "preliminary screening for eligibility conducted by
the district attorney pursuant to section 1000, based on information
peculiarly within his knowledge and in accordance with standards
prescribed by statute, does not constitute an exercise of judicial au-
thority. .... ,,53
With this distinction in mind, the California Supreme Court exam-
ined a similar "discretionary" provision providing for prosecutorial
veto in the companion case of People v. Superior Court (On Tal
Ho).54  Proceeding one step further, the California diversion statute
provides that, if it appears that the defendant may be eligible for the
program, it becomes necessary to investigate the facts bearing on the
particular defendant's suitability for diversion. This responsibility is
assigned by section 1000.1 to the probation department." After
further determining which community programs would benefit and ac-
cept the defendant, the probation department reports its findings and
mination of ineligibility is based and the evidence in support thereof. Id. at 76 n.6, 520
P.2d at 416 n.6, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.6.
49. Id. at 75-76, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
50. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
51. 11 Cal. 3d at 74, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31; cf. notes 33-42 supra
and accompanying text.
52. 11 Cal. 3d at 76, 520 P.2d at 415, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
53. Id. at 76, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
54. 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(a) (West Supp. 1974) provides in part:
If the defendant consents and waives his right to a speedy trial the district attorney
shall refer the case to the probation department. The probation department shall
make an investigation and take into consideration the defendant's age, employment
and service records, educational background, community and family ties, prior nar-
cotics or drug use, treatment history, if any, demonstrable motivation and other
mitigating factors in determining whether the defendant is a person whQ wovld be
benefited by education. treatment, or rehabilitation.
[Vol. 8
RECENT DECISIONS
recommendations to the court.56 The court then weighs the facts
presented by the probation department, and any other relevant infor-
mation, prior to making the decision either diverting or refusing to
divert the defendant into a rehabilitation program.57  Although these
provisions seemingly provide a first-time drug offender with a viable
means of avoiding the stigma of a full-scale criminal trial, any deter-
mination regarding diversion of the defendant rests solely with the dis-
trict attorney, the result of the prosecutorial veto provided in section
1000.2.58
A prosecutorial veto over the decision of a trial judge has been con-
sidered and rejected as unconstitutional by the 'California Supreme
Court in several analogous situations prior to On Tai Ho. Relying
on People v. Tenorio,5a Esteybar v. Municipal Court,60 People v. Nav-
arro,6' and People v. Clay,"2 the California Supreme Court concluded
56. Id. This section also specifies that
[tihe probation department shall also determine which community programs the de-
fendant could benefit from and which of those programs would accept the defend-
ant. The probation department shall report its findings and recommendation to the
court.
57. Id. § 1000.2, which provides:
The court shall hold a hearing and, after consideration of the probation depart-
ment's report and any other information considered by the court to be relevant to
its decision, shall determine if the defendant consents to further proceedings under
this chapter and waives his right to a speedy trial and if the defendant should be
diverted and referred for education, treatment, or rehabilitation.
Section 1000.2 also notes that the period of diversion is limited to a minimum of six
months and a maximum of two years, during which time progress reports are filed by
the probation department with the court bi-annually. When and if the defendant suc-
cessfully completes the program, the charges brought against him are dismissed. How-
ever, if the defendant is convicted of any offense during the period of the program, his
diverted case is returned to court for resumption of the original criminal proceedings.
58. See note 11 supra for pertinent text.
59. 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970).
60. 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d 1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971). Defendant was charged
with possession of marijuana, an offense which, in the absence of any prior felony con-
victions, may be treated as either a felony or misdemeanor. After the preliminary hear-
ing, the magistrate attempted to hold the defendant to answer on a misdemeanor charge
in municipal court. The district attorney, upon the authority of Penal Code section
17(b) (5), insisted that the defendant be held to answer on a felony charge in superior
court. On the same grounds as in Tenorio (see text accompanying note 65 infra), this
section was nullified with respect to the provision that conditioned the power of the
committing magistrate to determine whether a charged offense would be tried as a
misdemeanor rather than a felony upon the consent of the district attorney.
61. 7 Cal. 3d 248, 497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972). Defendant was con-
victed of selling and furnishing heroin. Imposition of sentencing was suspended pursu-
ant to section 3051 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code to determine if
defendant was a narcotics addict, and thus eligible for commitment to the custody of
the Director of Correctins f r confinement in the narcotic detention treatment an(d
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that the decision to divert a defendant into a rehabilitation program is
an exercise of judicial power and thus cannot constitutionally be sub-
ordinated to a veto of the prosecutor.63 It was to this precise question
that the People had directed their appeal, contending that the decision
to divert is not a judicial decision, but rather is an extension of the
charging process, and, hence, remains within the traditional zone of the
district attorney's discretion. 4
In an attempt to uphold this contention, the People sought to dis-
tinguish Tenorio, a case in which the defendant was arrested for pos-
session of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11530, which also imposed minimum prison terms for convictions with
one or two prior convictions. The Tenorio trial court dismissed allega-
tions of defendant's eight-year old prior conviction without approval of
the district attorney, therefore violating Health and Safety Code section
11718. In holding that the requirement of approval from the district
attorney violated the California constitutional requirement of separa-
tion of powers, the California Supreme Court noted: "When the de-
cision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal
or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature."0' 5
Arguably, this rationale could be viewed as inapposite to the diver-
sion of a defendant from the criminal process in the sense that the di-
version program does not lead to, enhance, or further either acquittal
or sentencing, and a district attorney's refusal to consent to diversion
means only that a defendant will go to trial as charged. 66 If in fact
the defendant is diverted, the criminal process is actually halted while
rehabilitation facility. Defendant was found to be an addict. The court then held a
sentencing hearing to determine if section 3052 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code precluded commitment of the defendant to the treatment program. Section 3052
could be a bar to his commitment because of defendant's prior conviction for assault.
However, section 3051 modifies this by providing that "in unusual cases" section 3052
could be ignored if the district attorney concurred. The district attorney refused. The
court, however, said that section 3051, which subjected the power of the trial court to
civilly commit a defendant in the interests of the justice to the concurrence of the district
attorney, was invalid as an infringement of the judicial power.
62. 18 Cal. App. 3d 964, 96 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1971). The Court of Appeal invalidated
the language of California Penal Code section 1203 which conditioned the trial court's
power to grant probation in the interests of justice upon the district attorney's concur-
rence.
63. 11 Cal. 3d at 65, 520 P.2d at 409, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
64. Id.
65. 3 Cal. 3d at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252, cited at 11 Cal. 3d at
65, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
66. 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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defendant is placed in a civil treatment program for six months to
two years. 7 The charges against the defendant are dismissed if he
successfully performs in the program.' It would therefore appear
that diversion leads away from acquittal or sentencing while leading
to civil treatment programs and ultimate dismissal of the pending
charges.
The reasoning can be buttressed by the fact that the actual diversion
hearing is not a typical hearing where defendant's fights are in jeop-
ardy. Although prior to the diversion hearing defendant must waive
his right to a speedy trial,10 the diversion report that is made to the
court and any statement or information provided by the defendant
are inadmissible in any subsequent proceeding involving the same
charge.70  Thus, it would appear that this program in no way aids
the process leading to acquittal or sentencing.
In dispensing with the contention that the diversion decision is but
an extension of the charging process, the court first noted that the Peo-
ple were "reading Tenorio and the present statute too narrowly." 71
A rational interpretation of the foregoing principle in Tenorio72 resulted
in the conclusion that, when the jurisdiction of a court has been in-
yoked by the filing of a criminal charge, any disposition of that charge
is a judicial responsibility.73  In support of this interpretation of Te-
norio, emphasis was -placed on the court's prior decision in Esteybar
where it was declared: "This argument overlooks the fact that the
magistrate's determination follows the district attorney's decision to pros-
ecute. '7
4
The court went on to explain that ithe statutory scheme is expressly
declared applicable when, and only when, the case is "before any court
67. See note 57 supra.
68. See note 57 supra.
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(a) (West Supp. 1974) provides in part: "If the de-
fendant consents and waives his right to a speedy trial the district attorney shall refer
the case to the probation department."
70. Id. § 1000.1(b) provides in part:
No statement, or any information procured therefrom, made by the defendant to
any probation officer which relates to the specific offense with which the defendant
is charged . . .shall be admissible in any action or proceeding brought subsequent
to the investigation, with respect to the specific offense with which the defendant
is charged.
71. 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 5 Cal. 3d at 127, 485 P.2d at 1145, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
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upon an accusatory pleading."75  By the time the case has gone
through the probation investigation and report prescribed by section
1000.1, and reaches -the hearing mandated by section 1000.2, "the
prosecutorial die has long since been cast."781 The case is before the
court for disposition, and disposition is a function of the judicial power
irrespective of the outcome.
Thus it appears that once the district attorney has made a deter-
mination of eligibility under section 1000 and allowed the case to en-
ter the probation department, his role in the decision to divert has
ended since the case has passed into the realm of the judiciary. The
court's conclusion in Sledge rested upon the district attorney's power
under section 1000 to determine preliminary eligibility. 77 In denying
eligibility, the case did not leave the hands of the district attorney until
trial and never reached the probation department.
Having once committed the case to the probation department, the
district attorney cannot subsequently change his mind or in any way
interfere with the final determination of the court. In making its de-
termination, the court admitted that acquittal or sentencing are the
typical options open to the court, but in appropriate cases alternate
means of disposition have been entrusted to the judiciary.7 s
Probation is a method frequently utilized in dealing with this type
of anti-social behavior.79 Civil commitment to a narcotics addict
rehabilitation program has also been cited by the supreme court as a
disposition which may be viewed as a specialized form of probation,
one that was held in Navarro to be an exercise of the judicial power.8 0
The court analogized the present diversion program to this judicial
power in probation and inferred that, indeed, the decision to divert is
a judicial power.81
75. 11 Cal. 3d at 65, 520 P.2d at 409-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 75, 520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32. See notes 30-40 supra and ac-
companying text.
78. 11 Cal. 3d at 65, 520 P.2d at 409-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
79. See note 81 infra.
80. See note 61 supra.
81. In dealing with the requirement of the district attorney's consent to the commit-
ment of a defendant to the custody of the Director of Corrections, the court in Navarro
was of the opinion that "the Legislature . . .can control eligibility for probation, parole,
and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the judicial process by subjecting a
judge to the control of the district attorney." 7 Cal. 3d at 259, 497 P.2d at 488, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 144. It is true that the legislature is not required in the first instance to
give the court power to commit to treatment programs, but, having conferred this power,
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The People's final contention was that the diversion hearing is
merely a "'quasi-administrative' inquiry into defendant's suitability for
a civil treatment program. 82  Although the parties are the same as
in the criminal process, it was stressed that the impact and effect of
the diversion hearing are really quasi-administrative. Similarities can be
shown between the diversion hearing and the historical administrative
treatment of juvenile offenders where, although the hearing appears
to be a criminal one, it is actually administrative in nature, attempting
to rehabilitate rather than to punish.8 As in the administrative treat-
ment of juveniles, the diversion of abusers of controlled substances fosters
rehabilitation and treatment in a non-criminal environment.8 4  In en-
acting sections 1000-1000.4, the legislature intended such rehabilita-
tion and not criminal incarceration. 5  The very word "diversion" im-
plies treatment that is not part of the criminal process but is instead
a separate, civilly-oriented treatment program. 6 Therefore, the People
argued that the judge's role in the diversion hearing is similar to that of
a hearing officer at an administrative proceeding and that, accordingly,
the legislature intended the decision to divert to be made by both the
judge and the district attorney.
8 7
it cannot condition its exercise upon the approval of the district attorney. Id. at
259-60, 497 P.2d at 488-89, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. The court here held that diver-
sion may be viewed as a specialized form of probation. Like programs of probation,
diversion is intended to offer a second chance to defendants who are "minimally involved
in crime and maximally motivated to reform." 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113
Cal. Rptr. at 26. The decision to divert is predicated on an in-depth appraisal of the
background and personality of the particular individual before the court.
82. 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
83. The United States Supreme Court pointed out the administrative nature of the
treatment of juvenile offenders in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967), when it stated:
The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be
"treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institu-
tionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
84. One commentator has noted:
In addition, diversion is humane-it deals directly with the underlying medical and
social problems of drug dependency. The chances of altering drug-related behavior
are better when carried out through treatment rather than through incarceration or
other criminal dispositions. With prosecution stayed and dismissal of charges pos-
sible, the defendant avoids the stigma and adverse consequences of a criminal con-
viction and the expenses associated with prosecution.
Robertson, supra note 8, at 336.
The concept of diversion has arisen
Eblecause the traditional process of trial, conviction, and incarceration has failed
to rehabilitate drug-dependent defendants and to stop the revolving door of crime,
new ways of dealing with the problem must be found.
Addict Diversion, supra note 5, at 669.
85. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
86. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
87. However appealing this argument may be, it is clear that a member of the judi-
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In response, Justice Mosk, for the majority, indicated that "a court
hearing need not be a full-fledged criminal trial in order to constitute
an exercise of the judicial power.""8  The diversion hearing mandated
by section 1000.2 is, by its terms, a judicial proceeding wherein the
court undertakes a "consideration" of the probation department's report
and of "any other information considered by the court to be relevant
to its decision."89 The court may then take evidence, hear arguments
and find the operative facts, all of which are clearly judicial acts. 0
The district attorney may screen for eligibility,91 the probation depart-
ment may investigate the facts, but it is the court which makes the final
decision to divert.92
It would also appear that either of the consequences of the decision
to divert is itself an exercise of the judicial power. If the defendant
fails the program his case will be "referred to the court for arraignment
and disposition" as "a regular criminal matter."93 But, if the defend-
ant is successful under the program, "the charges shall be dismissed.
' D4
Under California law, the dismissal of a formally filed criminal charge
is a judicial act which can be performed only by the court.9 5
ciary has no power to sit as an administrative officer unless that power is authorized by
the California constitution. This longstanding proposition was articulated in People v.
McKamy, 168 Cal. 531, 532, 143 P. 752, 753 (1914), wherein the court stated: "Itihat
the legislature has no power to confer upon the courts jurisdiction beyond that given or
authorized to be given them by the Constitution has long been settled." Since the Cali-
fornia constitution does not provide that a judge may sit as an administrative hearing
officer, any performance of such a duty is outside the scope of his jurisdictional power.
See note 29 supra.
88. 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
89. CAL.. PENAL CODE § 1000.2 (West Supp. 1974). This procedure is to be con-
trasted with the district attorney's preliminary determination where materiality and rele-
vancy are not at issue. 11 Cal. 3d at 66, 520 P.2d at 410, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26. See
note 51 supra and accompanying text.
90. Id., citing Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 127, 485 P.2d 1140, 1145,
95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1971), wherein the court stated:
Within the statutory framework, the magistrate at a preliminary hearing acts as an
independent arbiter of the issues presented by the adversaries. He weighs evidence,
resolves conflicts and gives or withholds credence to particular witnesses, and just
as these are judicial acts, so is the act of holding a defendant to answer.
(Citation, omitted.)
91. 11 Cal. 3d at 67, 520 P.2d at 411, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
92. Id.
93. Id.; CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1000.2 (West Supp. 1974).
94. 11 Cal. 3d at 67, 520 P.2d at 411, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1970) provides:
The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting
attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The rea-
sons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No
dismissal shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the
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In response to the California Supreme Court's -attack on the constitu-
tionality of these provisions, the legislature recently reconsidered the
diversion statute in an attempt to bring the scope of the provisions
within constitutional parametersf 6 A.B. 3096, as proposed, would
have amended the diversion statute to conform with the supreme
court's pronouncements in the Sledge and On Tai Ho cases. 97 The legis-
lature, however, chose only to extend the life of the diversion statute,98
leaving the prosecutorial veto invalidated in On Tai Ho intact. 9
A.B. 3096, although proposing to delete the prosecutorial veto,
would have left unchanged the power of the district attorney to deter-
mine initial eligibility. As previously discussed, the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Sledge upheld the constitutionality of this
provision by implying that the district attorney's role is ministerial, not
discretionary. 100 Irrespective of whether the district attorney's role is
categorized as ministerial or discretionary, due process would seem to
require that the defendant be given some opportunity to contest the
findings of the district attorney. If the district attorney's duty is minis-
terial, a hearing would insure that a finding of ineligibility could not
be based on any misinformation or clerical error.101 If the function
is discretionary, a hearing would provide review to protect against
abuse of that discretion. 0 2 A.B. 3096 failed to address itself to the
obvious need for due process protection.
The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,08 in find-
ing a parolee's liberty in parole revocations to be an interest requiring
accusatory pleading.
In furtherance of this policy, Penal Code section 1386 provides:
The entry of a nolle prosequi is abolished, and neither the Attorney General nor the
District Attorney can discontinue or abandon a prosecution for a public offense, ex-
cept as provided in the last section.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1386 (West 1970).
In interpreting section 1386 the court in People v. Parks, 230 Cal. App. 2d 805, 41
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1964), noted: "Entry of a nolle prosequi . . . has been abolished in
California; a district attorney can only recommend dismissal to the court. Dismissal is
within the latter's [the court's] exclusive discretion." Id. at 811-12, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 334,
citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1385-86; People v. Romero, 13 Cal. App. 2d 667, 670, 57
P.2d 557, 558 (1936).
96. Cal. A.B. 3096, Reg. Sess. (1974).
97. Id.
98. Ch. 1014, § 1 [1974] Cal. Stat.
99. See notes 59-87 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 45 supra.
101. See Diversion, supra note 2, at 929 n.37.
102. Id.
103. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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procedural protections, held that procedural safeguards must be pro-
vided if "the nature of the [individual's] interest is one within the con-
templation of the language of the liberty or property language of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 10 4 The interest of an individual in diversion
cases can be viewed as the same as that in parole revocations in that
if diversion is precluded, the defendant will be prosecuted, and,
since a defendant will ordinarily not request diversion if the case against
him is not strong enough to convict, -the practical effect of prosecution
will be conviction and a loss of liberty. Consequently, a defendant may
not be denied diversion without procedural safeguards, including a hear-
ing at which he may challenge the district attorney's grounds for an un-
favorable initial finding.10 5
It is possible that the court in Sledge, by limiting any judicial re-
view of the facts regarding eligibility until after conviction, may deny a
defendant due process of law.'06 The remedy is clearly sufficient when
a defendant seeks only to challenge the district attorney's application of
concrete facts and not to attack the truthfulness of the district attorney's
finding of the facts. However, when the defendant desires to contest
the veracity of the district attorney's factual findings, he is limited by
the role of the reviewing court. It is at this point that the adequacy
of such a post-conviction remedy appears questionable in light of the
traditional role of the appellate court.
Traditionally, the function of an appellate court is confined to the
review of questions of law rather than of fact, and in the absence of
abuse of discretion by the lower court, its findings of fact cannot be
disturbed.107  Because the defendant has had no opportunity to initially
challenge the facts of the district attorney as to his ineligibility for di-
version, there is no record before the higher court to form a basis for
review of the district attorney's findings.' 06 It is therefore possible that
104. Id. at 481.
105. Diversion, supra note 2, at 930.
106. See notes 47 & 48 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 138 Cal. App. 2d 505, 292 P.2d 267 (1956) (the
test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict); People
v. Lapin, 138 Cal. App. 2d 251, 291 P.2d 575 (1956) (it is not within the province of
the reviewing court to say that the trial court committed error unless such error appears
as a matter of law from the record presented); People v. Theus, 136 Cal. App. 2d 722,
289 P.2d 534 (1955) (reviewing court not permitted to reweigh evidence and draw in-
ferences contrary to those drawn by the lower court).
108. See, e.g., People v. Horton, 191 Cal. App. 2d 592, 13 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1961) (on
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction the appellate court is not
permitted to go outside the record of the trial court); People v. Pike, 183 Cal. App. 24
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a defendant could be denied diversion, convicted, and thereafter lose on
appeal because he was unable in the first instance to challenge the facts
and findings of the district attorney.
Whether or not a defendant will be confronted with this dilemma
is yet to be seen. However, should the problem arise, it is clear that
legislative inaction has left the vindication of defendant's due process
rights in the hands of a judiciary that has seemingly given support to
procedures which severely limit review of the district attorney's initial
determination of eligibility. Orderly review of the district attorney's
initial determination is required to ensure that the purposes underlying
the diversion statute are not defeated-review which can best be pro-
vided for by legislative enactment.
Michael J. Tramontin
729, 7 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1960) (on review of a conviction the court of appeal was not
permitted to go outside of the record of the trial court); People v. McKinney, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 332, 313 P.2d 163 (1957) (defendant could not supplement record on appeal
by means of a request to produce additionql evidence which was not part of the trial
ioprt record),
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